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How the War on Terror May Affect  
Domestic Interrogations:  
The 24 Effect 
 
Sam Kamin* 
INTRODUCTION 
For the first time since Miranda was decided nearly forty 
years ago,1 interrogation techniques have been at the forefront of 
the American consciousness.  The War on Terror has forced 
Americans to grapple with the definition of torture, whether tor-
ture is ever an appropriate interrogation technique, whether it is 
an effective interrogation technique, and so on.  Unlike many 
past discussions of interrogation techniques, the current torture 
debate has not been limited to law enforcement and the legal 
academy; discussions of torture and “hard treatment” have been 
front page news, have permeated popular culture, and have 
forced the American people to examine their preconceptions of 
the appropriateness of coercion in obtaining information from 
suspects. 
I call the omnipresence of depictions and discussions of tor-
ture in popular culture the “24 Effect.”2  We see torture depicted 
in fiction,3 on the news,4 and on the internet.5  My concern is not 
 
 * Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  Ph.D. 2000, J.D. 
1996, University of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1992, Amherst College.  The author wishes 
to thank the organizers of this Symposium, Alan Chen, Louis Frankenthaler, Viva Moffat, 
and Matt Parlow.  All errors remain mine alone. 
 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2 The effect is, of course, named after the Fox television show 24.  The show and its 
effect are described in Part III, infra. 
 3 24 is the most obvious example, but clearly far from the only one.  See, e.g., David 
Edelstein, Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex: Torture Porn, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 6, 2006, at 
63. 
 4 The Fox News Channel ran a three-part report on “waterboarding,” an interroga-
tion technique known to have been used by American forces interrogating terror suspects 
overseas.  A Fox reporter agreed to undergo the procedure at the hands of private soldiers 
dressed in black hoods.  He concluded that while it would be impossible to describe the 
procedure as anything other than torture, it was certainly “effective.” See Steve Harrigan, 
Waterboarding: Historically Controversial, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 7, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,227357,00.html. 
 5 The now-infamous photographs of the torture and degradation of prisoners at the 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq are available from numerous sources and in more excruciating 
detail on the internet than they ever were in the mainstream American press.  One of the 
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that the 24 Effect will necessarily cause torture to spill over from 
the War on Terror into local police departments’ interrogation 
rooms.6  I do not believe that the causal relationship is nearly 
that direct.7  Rather, my concern is that once the public has be-
come inured to torture by its repeated factual and fictional repre-
sentations—even its disturbing representations—the public will 
increasingly discount the effect of non-physical coercive interro-
gation techniques on criminal defendants and will become more 
receptive to the use of those non-torturous techniques in run-of-
the-mill criminal cases. 
The ultimate result of the 24 Effect, therefore, will likely be 
a shifting of the baseline for permissible treatment of criminal 
defendants; because psychological coercion, trickery, false prom-
ises and threats have a lesser visceral impact than the physical 
 
milder examples can be found on the Salon.com website along with an extensive exposi-
tion of the history of abuse in Abu Ghraib. See Joan Walsh, The Abu Ghraib Files, 
SALON.COM, Oct.–Dec. 2003, 
http://www.salon.com/news/abu_ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction/index.html.  
 6 Of course, it is not always easy to distinguish “crime” from the “War on Terror.”  
Take, for example, the case of Jose Padilla.  He was arrested at O’Hare airport in Chicago 
in May of 2002 and held in a Navy brig in South Carolina for several years, allegedly sus-
pected of plotting to explode a dirty bomb in the United States.  Just before his habeas 
petition was due to be heard by the Supreme Court, Padilla was transferred to a civilian 
prison and is currently awaiting greatly reduced charges in the Southern District of Flor-
ida.  Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline Terrorism Case of a U.S. Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2006, at A1; Errin Haines, Appeals Court Weighs Padilla Charge, FOXNEWS.COM, 
Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2007Jan10/ 
0,4670,PadillaTerrorCharges,00.html; see also Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006).  
For a fuller discussion of the interaction between civilian criminal prosecutions and the 
War on Terror, see M. Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warnings, Torture, the Right to 
Counsel and the War on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 619 (2007); Joan L. Larsen, Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Remarks at the Chapman Law Review Sympo-
sium: Miranda at 40: Applications in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007), 
available at http://www.chapman.edu/LawReview/symposium2007_webcast.asp (follow 
“Click here for Panel #1” hyperlink). 
 7 There is some evidence, however, that what appears on television has a direct ef-
fect on interrogation techniques in the field.  For example, an Army official recently met 
with writers and producers of the Fox Television show 24 in order to try to convince them 
that their show had a deleterious effect on interrogations in the military. 
[The army officials] had come to voice their concern that the show’s central po-
litical premise—that the letter of American law must be sacrificed for the coun-
try’s security—was having a toxic effect.  In their view, the show promoted un-
ethical and illegal behavior and had adversely affected the training and 
performance of real American soldiers.  “I’d like them to stop,” [one officer] said 
of the show’s producers.  “They should do a show where torture backfires.” 
  . . . . 
  . . . The third expert at the meeting was Tony Lagouranis, a former Army 
interrogator in the war in Iraq. He told the show’s staff that DVDs of shows 
such as “24” circulate widely among soldiers stationed in Iraq.  Lagouranis said 
to me, “People watch the shows, and then walk into the interrogation booths 
and do the same things they’ve just seen.” 
Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes: Torture on “24”, NEW YORKER, Feb. 19 & 26, 2007, at 66, 
72, 77. 
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torture to which we are all becoming accustomed, courts as well 
as the public at large are likely to become more accepting of these 
techniques.  This is particularly distressing given the fact that 
non-torturous but coercive interrogation techniques are highly 
correlated with unreliable confessions and with wrongful convic-
tions.8  Thus, in addition to the dignitary harms that befall crimi-
nal defendants and the rest of society whenever statements are 
coerced from criminal defendants, the bottom-line result of the 24 
Effect will be more convictions of the innocent and, by logical ex-
tension, more guilty criminals going unpunished. 
In this Article, I briefly trace the history of police interroga-
tion and its legal regulation in the United States, from the found-
ing-era understanding that a defendant’s silence was entitled to 
great respect, to the modern practice of Miranda warnings and 
voluntariness inquiries.  I then turn to the portrayal of torture in 
contemporary media, arguing that whatever the motivation may 
be for the production of these images, their effect will be to de-
sensitize Americans to the effects of torture.  Returning then to 
interrogation, I argue that this desensitizing effect of omnipres-
ent torture will make Americans more accepting of coercive but 
nonviolent interrogation techniques.  I show that, given the close 
connection between coercive interrogation techniques and wrong-
ful convictions, we should be very concerned about this develop-
ment, regardless of our thoughts about the continuing wisdom 
and relevance of the Miranda decision. 
I. HISTORY—THE EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 
AND THEIR REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Not much is known about interrogation techniques prior to 
the turn of the last century.9  Because the individual guarantees 
of the Fifth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights had not 
yet been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Four-
 
 8 See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Recon-
sidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 
(2006); TIMOTHY SULLIVAN, UNEQUAL VERDICTS: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS 23–
47, 84–85 (1992). 
 9 It is known that compulsory questioning of witnesses was a favorite technique of 
the Star Chamber, and that the Fifth Amendment adopted the then-common practice in 
the colonies of prohibiting the compulsory questioning of suspects at trial.  See, e.g., Al-
bert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Si-
lent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2649 (1996); 4 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & 
ENFORCEMENT [WICKERSHAM COMMISSION], REPORT ON PROSECUTION 25–26 (1931).  A 
number of commentators have argued that the right was meant to be limited to question-
ing in the courtroom.  See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court’s Construction of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1930).  For a discussion of early un-
derstandings of the Fifth Amendment, see generally Alschuler, supra. 
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teenth Amendment,10 there was relatively little litigation of in-
terrogation cases until the late nineteenth century.11  In one of 
the first such cases, the 1897 case of Bram v. United States,12 the 
Supreme Court held that any official inducements or threats 
whatsoever were sufficient to render a confession invalid.13  Bor-
rowing from centuries of English common law, the Bram Court 
determined that the use of threats or promises to induce a defen-
dant to confess violated the defendant’s rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.14 
The facts of Bram are illustrative.  Bram was suspected of 
murder.  Another suspect, Brown, had been interviewed prior to 
Bram’s interrogation.  The examining officer admitted in court 
that he had said the following to Bram: 
“Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed the captain from 
all I have heard from Mr. Brown.  But,” I said, “some of us here think 
you could not have done all that crime alone.  If you had an accom-
 
 10 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968) (cataloguing the incorpora-
tion of various rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 11 Alan G. Gless, Self-Incrimination Privilege Dvelopment [sic] in the Nineteenth-
Century Federal Courts: Questions of Procedure, Privilege, Production, Immunity and 
Compulsion, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 391 (2001). 
  The United States Supreme Court did not decide a self-incrimination issue 
in a federal criminal case during the first ninety years after the ratification of 
the Fifth Amendment.  The reason was simple.  The Court almost completely 
lacked any appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal cases for most of the 
first ninety years. 
Id. at 393. 
 12 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
 13 Id. at 565.  It is also fairly clear that the Court did not entirely mean what it said 
in Bram.  As Professor Marcus has argued: 
  The greatest reach of this notion would be to take it literally so that any 
degree of inducement would be sufficient to invalidate an otherwise permissi-
ble statement by the defendant.  Not surprisingly, very few courts have ever 
followed such an interpretation.  Instead, the modern view of the statement is 
that threats and promises are to be taken seriously but that these are rarely 
determinative on their own. 
Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just about Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions 
in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 606 (2006). 
 14 A number of critics have lambasted Bram as a misreading of both the Fifth 
Amendment and the English cases on which the Court purported to base its decision.  See, 
e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable 
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005). 
  Rather than examine the text, the Court simply borrowed the voluntari-
ness test from a line of early English and American common law cases and 
used it in place of the compulsion paradigm textually delineated within the 
self-incrimination clause.  While these early cases stand for the proposition 
that confessions must be voluntary in order to be admissible, they are histori-
cally unrelated to the self-incrimination clause and the interrogation practices 
the self-incrimination clause was intended to ban. 
Id. at 478 (citations omitted); Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme 
Court, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 777 n.101 (“As a matter of history the Bram Court was 
probably wrong.” (citations omitted)). 
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plice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime 
on your own shoulders.”15 
The court invalidated the confession on the basis of these 
statements by the officer.16  Needless to say, such comments 
would hardly raise an eyebrow today.  The police officers in Bram 
encouraged Bram to confess, but certainly did nothing that would 
render his confession involuntary under the standard currently 
applied by our courts.17 
It is fairly clear that, although the Bram Court was ex-
tremely protective of the rights of suspects, interrogation prac-
tices in the United States did not necessarily follow suit.  In par-
ticular, with regard to minority or unpopular defendants, it is 
clear that police practices during this time were anything but 
protective of the rights and dignity of suspects.18  In the 1930s, 
the Wickersham Commission Report on police practices both ex-
posed and decried the widespread physical abuse of criminal sus-
pects at the hands of interrogators throughout this country. 
To obtain confessions or admissions the officers (usually detectives) 
proceed to “work” the prisoner.  “Work” is the term used to signify any 
form of what is commonly called the third degree, and may consist in 
nothing more than a severe cross-examination.  Perhaps in most cases 
it is no more than that, but the prisoner knows that he is wholly at 
the mercy of his inquisitor and that the severe cross-examination may 
at any moment shift to a severe beating.  This knowledge itself un-
doubtedly induces speedy confessions in many instances and makes 
unnecessary a resort to force.  If the prisoner refuses to answer, he 
may be returned to his cell with notice that there he will stay till 
ready to “come clean.”  The cell may be especially chosen for the pur-
pose—cold, dark, without bed or chair.  The sweat box is a small cell 
completely dark and arranged to be heated till the prisoner, unable to 
endure the temperature, will promise to answer as desired.  Or refusal 
to answer may be overcome by whipping, by beating, with rubber 
hose, clubs, or fists, or by kicking, or by threats, or promises. 
  Powerful lights turned full on the prisoner’s face, or switched on 
and off, have been found effective.  The electric chair is another device 
to extort confessions. 
  The most commonly used method is persistent questioning, con-
 
 15 Bram, 168 U.S. at 539. 
 16 Id. at 564–65. 
 17 For a discussion of current confession law, see infra Part II. 
 18 There is a strong overlap between the Court’s criminal procedure cases and its 
cases protecting racial minorities.  See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Ac-
tivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305–06 (1982) (“Although the 
Court had never treated them as race cases, there can be little doubt that the decisions in 
Moore v. Dempsey, Powell v. Alabama, and Brown v. Mississippi made new criminal pro-
cedure law in part because the notorious facts of each case exemplified the national scan-
dal of racist southern justice.” (citations omitted)). 
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tinuing hour after hour, sometimes by relays of officers.  It has been 
known since 1500 at least that deprivation of sleep is the most effec-
tive torture and certain to produce any confession desired.19 
The Wickersham Commission did not merely describe the 
third degree, it decried it; the Commission noted that torture was 
a sign of laziness and a lack of initiative on the part of law en-
forcement.  Only a police officer without faith in his own wits and 
intelligence, the Commission argued, would resort to brute force 
in order to obtain a confession.20 
The kind of brutality discussed by the Wickersham Commis-
sion led to a national revulsion21 and was unequivocally rejected 
by the Supreme Court shortly thereafter.  In Brown v. Missis-
sippi,22 the Supreme Court was confronted with a case in which a 
Mississippi sheriff’s deputy admitted quite freely to brutalizing a 
black defendant in very much the same way described by the 
Wickersham Commission. 
[T]he two last named defendants were made to strip and they were 
laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap 
with buckles on it, and they were likewise made by the said deputy 
definitely to understand that the whipping would be continued unless 
and until they confessed, and not only confessed, but confessed in 
every matter of detail as demanded by those present; and in this 
manner the defendants confessed the crime, and as the whippings 
progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their confes-
sion in all particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of 
their torturers. 
  . . . . 
  . . . It is interesting to note that in his testimony with reference to 
the whipping of the defendant Ellington, and in response to the in-
quiry as to how severely he was whipped, the deputy stated, “Not too 
 
 19 11 WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 47 
(1931). 
 20 The Commission decried these tactics as laziness in the extreme.   
A former district attorney of New York County said: “It would enhance the abil-
ity of the police force if the practice was stamped out.  It is a short cut and 
makes the police lazy and unenterprising.”  Another former New York prosecu-
tor stated that it impaired police efficiency; if the police “could not get their re-
sults by brawn, they were helpless.” 
Id. at 188. 
 21 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional 
Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 313–14 (2003).  
“Third degree” brutality by police officials, however, was judged constitutionally 
anathema by the Supreme Court in the aftermath of the exposure and condem-
nation of the practice by such authorities as the American Bar Association and 
the Wickersham Commission Report in the early 1930s.  That official rejection 
was reinforced by the revulsion against torture as characteristic of America’s to-
talitarian enemies. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 22 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
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much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it were left to 
me.”  Two others who had participated in these whippings were intro-
duced and admitted it—not a single witness was introduced who de-
nied it. The facts are not only undisputed, they are admitted, and ad-
mitted to have been done by officers of the state, in conjunction with 
other participants, and all this was definitely well known to everybody 
connected with the trial, and during the trial, including the state’s 
prosecuting attorney and the trial judge presiding.23 
The Court acknowledged that while the states are generally 
free to organize their criminal justice systems however they wish, 
such freedom comes with clear boundaries.   
Because a State may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that 
it may substitute trial by ordeal.  The rack and torture chamber may 
not be substituted for the witness stand.  The State may not permit an 
accused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination—where the 
whole proceeding is but a mask—without supplying corrective proc-
ess.24   
Clearly, the Court argued, the abuse of criminal defendants in 
order to obtain a confession fell beyond the permissible range of 
options available to the states. 
Although it would be naïve to think that the Court’s decision 
in Brown single-handedly caused the cessation of the third de-
gree,25 the available empirical evidence certainly indicates that 
by the time Miranda was decided some thirty years later, the 
third degree as an interrogation technique had virtually disap-
peared from contemporary police practice.26  While prisoners and 
defendants were no doubt still being abused at the hands of po-
lice after the Supreme Court prohibited such practices, Brown 
and its progeny had made clear that using physical violence to 
extract information was worse than useless in terms of criminal 
prosecution.27  If police wished merely to harm or intimidate 
those under their custody, they could continue to do so subject 
only to civil and criminal actions against them; if they wished to 
prosecute those abused defendants in court using information ob-
 
 23 Id. at 284–85 (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470–71 (Mo. 1935) (Griffith, J., 
dissenting)). 
 24 Id. at 285–86.  Of course, the Supreme Court would later conclude that a state 
may not do away with trial by jury.  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 25 As Richard Leo argues, the professionalization of police departments throughout 
the nation also played an important part in the disappearance of the third degree.  Rich-
ard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in 
America, 18 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 47–52 (1992). 
 26 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, at 446–48 (1966) (noting that, al-
though instances of the third degree clearly continued to exist, “we stress that the modern 
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented”). 
 27 See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, American Interrogation: From Torture to Trickery, in 
TORTURE: A COLLECTION 105 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (discussing the legal admissi-
bility of torture-induced confessions). 
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tained through the third degree, however, Bram and its progeny 
made clear that they would be unable to do so.28 
Police departments reacted to the loss of the third degree by 
developing a number of interrogation techniques designed to 
achieve the third degree’s goals.  When Miranda was decided in 
1966, requiring the now-familiar warnings in all instances of cus-
todial interrogation, the Court made extensive reference to the 
coercive but non-violent interrogation techniques catalogued and 
perfected by Inbau and Reid in their police interrogation materi-
als and in wide use throughout the country.29 
Although the Miranda Court was extremely critical of these 
interrogation techniques, it chose not to invalidate them whole-
sale, but rather to interpose the four warnings30 between the ac-
cused and that coercion.  As commentators have criticized for 
nearly forty years, once a defendant has been made aware of and 
voluntarily waived his rights, the inherently coercive techniques 
that the Court criticized in Miranda may continue to be used so 
long as they do not render the defendant’s confession “involun-
tary.”31 
 
 28 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
 29 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 (“The interrogator should direct his comments 
toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure by asking 
the subject whether he did it.  Like other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad family 
life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for 
women.  The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to 
cast blame on the victim, or on society.  These tactics are designed to put the subject in a 
psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to 
know already—that he is guilty.”  (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 34–43, 87, 43–55 (1962))); see also id. at 451 (“Where 
emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an oppressive at-
mosphere of dogged persistence.  He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving 
the subject no prospect of surcease.  He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him 
with his inexorable will to obtain the truth.  He should interrogate for a spell of several 
hours pausing only for the subject’s necessities in acknowledgment of the need to avoid a 
charge of duress that can be technically substantiated.  In a serious case, the interroga-
tion may continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but with no 
respite from the atmosphere of domination.  It is possible in this way to induce the subject 
to talk without resorting to duress or coercion.  The method should be used only when the 
guilt of the subject appears highly probable.”  (quoting  CHARLES E. O’HARA, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 112 (1956))). 
 30 The police must warn a suspect: 1) that he has the right to remain silent, 2) that 
anything he says may be used against him, 3) that he has the right to an attorney, and 4) 
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed to represent him.  Id. at 444. 
 31 See, e.g., Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession 
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 
1020 (1988). 
[W]aiver . . . appeared to be the Achilles’ heel of the Miranda decision.  The 
Supreme Court emphasized the conditions and inherent evils of custodial in-
terrogation in concluding that the process was inherently coercive.  As a result, 
the voluntariness test could not be relied upon to regulate confession admissi-
bility.  However, the question remained whether these same factors would un-
dercut the legitimacy of Miranda waivers.  The more astute custodial suspects 
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It is important to remember that the Court did not replace 
the voluntariness test that had preceded Miranda with a test 
that looked merely at whether or not the Miranda warnings were 
administered.32  Rather, the Court created an additional layer of 
protection on top of the voluntariness inquiry: A confession ob-
tained in violation of Miranda is irrebuttably presumed to be in-
voluntary.33  However, a confession obtained after the Miranda 
warnings have been read to a defendant is admissible only so 
long as both the waiver of Miranda rights and the subsequent 
confession itself were voluntarily obtained.34 
II. INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS TODAY 
There has been much scholarly discussion in recent years re-
garding the effect that the Miranda warnings have had on the 
number of confessions obtained from criminal suspects.  Some 
have argued that the warnings have lead to the rejection of a 
number of otherwise voluntary confessions and to the loss of 
many convictions.35  Others have argued with equal force that, 
while confessions may have been lost immediately following the 
Miranda decision, police departments have effectively adapted to 
the new rules, developing techniques that are at least as efficient 
at obtaining confessions from resistant defendants as the coer-
cive techniques used before Miranda.  Just as police departments 
adapted to the loss of the third degree following Brown, they 
have adapted to the warnings that the Miranda dissenters wor-
ried would be the death of confessions in criminal investigation.36 
Regardless of whether the number of confessions since 
 
would now be able to assert their rights, but the remainder might well suc-
cumb to the environment and waive their rights due to “inherent coercion” just 
as pre-Miranda suspects had succumbed and answered police questions. 
Id. 
 32 Congress attempted to undo this decision in 1968 with its passage of § 3501, which 
stated that voluntariness was the only standard for determining the admissibility of con-
fessions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000). 
 33 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (“The warnings required and the waiver necessary in 
accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, pre-
requisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“The requirement 
that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness in-
quiry.”); Marcus, supra note 13, at 638 (“The test today for voluntariness remains what it 
has been for more than half a century: Judges ‘look at the totality of the circumstances of 
the case in determining whether the confession was voluntary.’” (quoting State v. Barden, 
572 S.E.2d 108, 124 (N.C. 2002))). 
 35 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996). 
 36 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996); Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial 
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996). 
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Miranda has gone up or down, nearly everyone seems to agree 
that contemporary courts place enormous weight on whether 
Miranda warnings were given, essentially endorsing as volun-
tary any statement that is made following the warnings and the 
voluntary waiver of the rights contained therein.37  For much the 
same reason that the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave a pre-
cursor to the Miranda warnings long before they were required 
to do so, many prosecutors and members of law enforcement op-
posed the argument in Dickerson to return to the pre-Miranda 
status quo.  The warnings have so immunized the police conduct 
that follows that, as one of the participants in this Symposium 
succinctly put it, “If the [Supreme] Court had not imposed the 
warnings on the police, they would eventually have discovered 
their value and given them anyway.”38 
 
 37 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense 
with the voluntariness inquiry.  But as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty, 
“[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-
incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforce-
ment authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”  
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)). 
 38 Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. 
REV. 551, 566 (2007).  In fact, as the Supreme Court noted in Miranda, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigations was giving warnings akin to those mandated in Miranda prior to 
the Court’s mandate.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483.  As proof that courts are not taking seri-
ously the requirement of judging the totality of the circumstances in cases in which a de-
fendant was properly Mirandized, consider the following from a recent article by Professor 
Marcus: 
  This Article has considered thousands of opinions on confessions from the 
past two decades.  One necessarily comes away with a feeling of being unclean 
and tainted by government activities that are not honorable even given the en-
vironment needed for interrogations.  Many judges allow confessions into evi-
dence in cases in which police interrogators lied and threatened defendants or 
played on the mental, emotional, or physical weaknesses of suspects.  While 
judges write that they do not condone such conduct and find such practices re-
pugnant, reprehensible, or deplorable, some of those same judges have upheld 
the admission of such confessions that result from those practices after apply-
ing the totality of circumstances test. 
Marcus, supra note 13, at 643 (citations omitted).  See also Richard A. Leo, Questioning 
the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1021–22 
(2001). 
[F]or the most part, Miranda has helped, not hurt, law enforcement.  As ar-
gued above, Miranda has helped law enforcement by de facto displacing the 
case-by-case voluntariness standard as the primary test of a confession’s ad-
missibility, in effect shifting courts’ analysis from the voluntariness of a con-
fession to the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver.  By creating the opportunity 
for police to read suspects their constitutional rights and by allowing police to 
obtain a signed waiver form that signifies consensual and non-coercive interro-
gation, Miranda has helped the police shield themselves from evidentiary chal-
lenges, rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/or involuntary confes-
sions. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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III. DEPICTIONS OF INTERROGATION AND TORTURE IN THE PUBLIC 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
It is against this legal and historical background that the 
current public discussions and depictions of torture and hard 
treatment appear.  At least since the start of the War on Terror 
in 2001, discussions and depictions of torture have been front-
page news in the United States.  Leaked photographs of mis-
treated prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq made prime-
time news,39 Congress and the executive branch have debated the 
appropriate role of torture in American foreign policy,40 and furor 
arose over the so-called “torture memo,” in which now-Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzalez argued that the Geneva Convention’s 
prohibitions on torture do not apply to terror suspects.41  The le-
gal academy was drawn into the popular debate on terror, led in 
no small part by University of California, Berkeley law professor 
John Yoo, who was a deputy to Gonzalez at the time the torture 
memo was written,42 and who has written extensively on how in-
ternational agreements on the treatment of prisoners do not ap-
ply to the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.43 
At the same time that this discussion of actual American pol-
 
 39 Charlotte Sector, More Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse Photos Leaked: Australian TV 
Sidesteps Efforts by the U.S. Government to Squash Release, ABC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2006, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1621440.  
 40 For example, on December 14, 2005, the House of Representatives passed the De-
partment of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. (2005), a bill regulating 
interrogation by U.S. military officials.  The bill, already passed by the Senate, received 
the grudging support of the White House; it was signed into law by President Bush on De-
cember 30, 2005.  See Josh White, President Relents, Backs Torture Ban: McCain Proposal 
Had Veto-Proof Support, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Press Release, The White 
House, President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the “Department of Defense, 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, 
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006” (Dec. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html. 
 41 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 
2002), available at http://msnbc.com/modules/newsweek/pdf/gonzales_memo.pdf.  In the 
memo, Gonzalez defends the need to dispense with the Geneva Conventions on the 
grounds that “[t]he nature of the new war places a high premium on other factors, such as 
the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in 
order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians.”  Id. at 2.  
 42 Boalt Hall School of Law, Professor John Yoo, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
faculty/yooj/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
 43 While not discussing his role in the production of the torture memo, Professor Yoo 
defends much of its contents in John Yoo, Behind the ‘Torture Memos’, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (N. Cal. Edition), Jan. 2, 2005, at 1P.  Yoo is hardly the only legal aca-
demic, however, who has weighed in on the torture debate.  See, e.g., TORTURE: A 
COLLECTION, supra note 27; Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. 
CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19 (arguing that nonlethal torture techniques “such as sterile 
needles, being inserted beneath the nails to cause excruciating pain” should be permitted 
if law enforcement demonstrates to a magistrate the “absolute need to obtain immediate 
information in order to save lives coupled with probable cause that the suspect had such 
information and is unwilling to reveal it”). 
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icy was making headlines, the media began bombarding us with 
fictional depictions of torture.  In movies,44 on television,45 even 
in the streets (see image, below), depictions of torture are every-
where in our popular culture.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MILTON GLASER & MIRKO ILIĆ, THE DESIGN OF DISSENT 66 (2005).  Such 
images have become the subject of a variety of parodies or social com-
mentaries.       
In 2006, David Edelstein of New York Magazine coined the 
phrase “torture porn” to describe a new slate of horror movies 
aimed at teenagers, linking the rise of “torture porn” to contem-
 
 44 The PG-13 James Bond film Casino Royale had a scene of graphic genital torture.  
CASINO ROYALE (MGM 2006).  The Oscar-winning film The Last King of Scotland explic-
itly depicts a man being hung from meat hooks piercing his chest.  THE LAST KING OF 
SCOTLAND (DNA Films 2006).  In Hostel, vivisections of unsuspecting tourists are par for 
the course.  HOSTEL (Hostel LLC 2005). 
 45 See, e.g., 24: Day 6: 11:00 AM–12:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 29, 2007).  
24 is the most obvious example, but others come to mind.  For example, a recurring theme 
on ABC’s Lost is the toll that becoming a torturer during war has had on one of the char-
acters.  Although the character is clearly haunted by what he has done, his skills come in 
handy more than once.  Lost: One of Them (ABC television broadcast Feb. 15, 2006); Lost: 
Enter 77 (ABC television broadcast Mar. 7, 2007).   
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porary events: 
Post-9/11, we’ve engaged in a national debate about the morality of 
torture, fueled by horrifying pictures of manifestly decent men and 
women (some of them, anyway) enacting brutal scenarios of domina-
tion at Abu Ghraib.  And a large segment of the population evidently 
has no problem with this.  Our righteousness is buoyed by propaganda 
like the TV series 24, which devoted an entire season to justifying tor-
ture in the name of an imminent threat: a nuclear missile en route to 
a major city.  Who do you want defending America? Kiefer Sutherland 
or terrorist-employed civil-liberties lawyers?46 
Edelstein argues that in the wake of pictures and discussion 
of actual torture on the front page of the newspaper, torture has 
become far more acceptable in fiction: “Explicit scenes of torture 
and mutilation were once confined to the old 42nd 
Street . . . whereas now they have terrific production values and 
a place of honor in your local multiplex.”47  In other words, events 
have taken torture mainstream.48 
As Edelstein’s article makes clear, when it comes to depic-
tions of torture in the post-9/11 universe, the Fox show 24 stands 
above all others.49  Centered on the Los Angeles office of the fic-
tional Counter-Terrorism Unit (“CTU”), 24 is primarily the story 
of a single agent, Jack Bauer, portrayed by Kiefer Sutherland.50  
 
 46 Edelstein, supra note 3, at 64. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See John Hayes, Tolerance for Torture: TV and Movies Up the Ante on Graphic 
Torture Scenes and Audiences Keep Coming Back for More, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
Jan. 19, 2007, at C-1. 
 The American security agent is strapped to a chair beside a table covered 
with knives and assorted medical tools.  A sadistic Middle Eastern terrorist 
whispers gentle insults into his ear as he roughly twists the blade—and the 
agent screams in agony.   
  It’s not a midnight screening of a campy 1960s Russ Meyer splatter classic, 
or even an R-rated teen slasher film.  It’s the sixth-season premiere of the Fox 
TV hit “24.” 
  . . . . 
  It’s curious that America’s taste for more fictional media torture is happen-
ing at a time when real-life torture is a daily ordeal in Iraq, and the nation is 
debating America’s use of coercive interrogation methods and splitting hairs 
over the definition of “torture.” 
Id. 
 49 The Parents Television Council, a non-partisan organization that monitors the 
content of prime-time television shows, has singled out 24 for the darkness of its content: 
  The PTC review found that Fox’s “24” showed 67 scenes of torture in the 
first five seasons.  Upon review of prime time broadcast programming from 
1995 to 2001, there were 110 scenes of torture.  From 2002 to 2005, the number 
increased to 624 scenes of torture. 
Press Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Calls for More Network Responsibility 
over Violent Content: PTC Reveals New Research on Torture Scenes (Feb. 14, 2007), 
available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/release/2007/0214.asp. 
 50 Parents Television Council, Twenty Four—Parents Television Council Family TV 
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Jack and CTU battle repeated terrorist attacks on American soil, 
relying on improbably sophisticated surveillance technology,51 
flawless intuition,52 and, quite often, torture.53 
The sixth season of the show has been no exception.  In the 
first three weeks the show was on the air, spanning six episodes, 
Jack is released from a Chinese prison, bearing the physical and 
emotional scars of nearly two years of what was likely nearly 
constant torture.54  He is released only to be handed over to a 
Middle-Eastern terrorist who has promised to cease his attacks 
against American civilians in exchange for the right to torture 
Jack who, it turns out, had tortured the terrorist’s brother years 
before.55  Jack escapes his sadistic captor and, within hours, is 
interrogating his own brother.56  Rightly intuiting that his inter-
rogation subject has not told him the complete truth, Jack ties 
him to a chair and holds a plastic bag over his head, cutting off 
his breathing until he gives up the truth about nuclear devices 
loose on American soil.57 
Here is what we have learned about torture from 24, not just 
this season, but throughout its run.  First, torture works.  The 
imposition of torture on a suspect invariably and almost instan-
taneously forces the suspect to speak and to speak truthfully 
 
Guide Show Page, http://www.parentstv.org/ptc/shows/main.asp?shwid=1538 (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2007); FOX Television Broadcast Company, 24, http://www.fox.com/24/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 30, 2007).   
 51 See, e.g., 24: Day 4: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 10, 2005); 
24: Day 6: 1:00 PM–2:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 12, 2007) (using real-time 
satellite feeds to track moving suspects and vehicles).  The technical savvy of CTU stands 
in marked contrast to the technological backwardness of actual U.S. counter-terrorism 
officials.  See, e.g., Dan Eggen, FBI Pushed Ahead with Troubled Software, WASH. POST, 
June 6, 2005, at A1 (describing the FBI’s failed attempt to develop a computerized case 
management system which ended up costing taxpayers $170 million); Noah Shachtman, 
The Federal Bureau of Luddites: Why There Are Still FBI Agents Who Don’t Have E-mail 
Addresses, SLATE, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2139274/ (describing the FBI’s 
inability to provide email addresses to all of its relevant employees).  See also Timothy P. 
Carney, I am Jack Bauer: What 24 Means for Homeland Security, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, 
June 26, 2006, http://search.nationalreview.com (enter “I Am Jack Bauer” (including quo-
tation marks) in “Search Terms” field and click “Search”). 
 52 See, for example, 24: 12:00 AM–1:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Nov. 6, 2001), 
where Jack blackmails George Mason upon speculation that he stole money from the gov-
ernment; 24: Day 2: 12:00 PM–1:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Nov. 26, 2002), where 
Jack deduces that Mason is suffering from radiation sickness; and 24: Day 6: 10:00 AM–
11:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 22, 2007), when Jack decides his brother is lying 
about his level of knowledge based solely on his brother’s mannerisms.  
 53 See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 54 24: Day 6: 6:00 AM–7:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 14, 2007).  
 55 Id.   
 56 Id.; 24: Day 6: 7:00 AM–8:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Jan. 14, 2007); 24: Day 
6: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM, supra note 52; 24: Day 6: 11:00 AM–12:00 PM, supra note 45. 
 57 24: Day 6: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM, supra note 52; 24: Day 6: 11:00 AM–12:00 PM, su-
pra note 45; 24: Day 6: 12:00 PM–1:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 5, 2007).  
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about what she knows.58  Jack Bauer can tell when a suspect is 
lying or withholding important evidence and his application of 
torture can make the suspect speak and make him speak truth-
fully.59  On a recent episode of the show, Jack uses a high-tech 
lie-detector to augment his impeccable intuition regarding 
whether or not a suspect is telling all he knows.60  Although lie-
detectors in the real world are so unreliable that their results are 
almost never admissible at trial, on television they are infalli-
 
 58 See, for example, 24: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 12, 
2002), where Jack slams a man’s head into a partition, tapes him up, and threatens to 
torture him if the man does not take Jack to where his wife and daughter are being held 
hostage, which he does; 24: Day 2: 9:00 PM–10:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 25, 
2003), where Jack shoots a woman suspected of having information about a bomb in the 
arm and then refuses to give her pain medication until she divulges the information about 
the location of a bomb, which again, she does; 24: Day 3: 8:00 AM–9:00 AM (FOX televi-
sion broadcast Apr. 27, 2004), where Jack threatens to torture the daughter of a man who 
is about to release a deadly virus in San Francisco in order to find out his location; 24: 
Day 4: 12:00 AM–1:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Apr. 18, 2005), where Jack breaks a 
suspect’s fingers, one by one, to get him to release the whereabouts of another suspected 
terrorist; 24: Day 5: 9:00 PM–10:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Mar. 27, 2006), when 
the “torture tools” are brought out and Jack’s love interest is given a drug to induce her to 
talk, and Jack threatens to kill another woman in order to get her to admit that she, not 
Jack’s love interest, is the real culprit; 24: Day 6: 5:00 PM–6:00 PM (FOX television 
broadcast Mar. 5, 2007), when Jack uses a cigar cutter to cut off the tip of a suspect’s 
pinky, and the suspect then states that a terrorist is in the Mojave Desert preparing to 
launch aerial drones to deliver nuclear warheads.  There is, of course, a wealth of infor-
mation, all of which indicates that torture is an incredibly ineffective interrogation tech-
nique.  See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 261–62 (2004); 
DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY (forthcoming 2007) (“Advocates of torture often 
assume that torture works in this sense better than other methods of investigation and all 
that is left is the moral justification.  But if torture does not work, if it cannot be adminis-
tered professionally, scientifically, and productively, if it offers no temporal advantage in 
the case of “a ticking time bomb,” then the whole argument is pointless.  Can torture be 
used to intimidate prisoners?  Yes.  Can it force false confessions [sic] yes?  Can it produce 
true information better than other policing techniques?  No. . . . The available empirical 
evidence on this is conclusive.”). 
 59 The only exception to this role, it seems, is Bauer himself: 
Virtually the sole exception to this rule is Jack Bauer.  The current season be-
gins with Bauer being released from a Chinese prison, after two years of cease-
less torture; his back is scarred and his hands are burnt, but a Communist offi-
cial who transfers Bauer to U.S. custody says that he “never broke his silence.” 
Mayer, supra note 7, at 69. See also 24: Day 2: 2:00 AM–3:00 AM (FOX television broad-
cast Apr. 15, 2003) (showing Jack bound and gagged, his abdomen is cut several times 
with a scalpel dipped in ammonia, and the open wounds are burnt; he is then tasered 
twice and then CPR and epinephrine must be administered to revive him; Jack reveals 
nothing); 24: Day 2: 3:00 AM–4:00 AM (FOX television broadcast Apr. 22, 2003) (showing 
Jack’s chest being shocked with a defibrillator, after which he is given a dose of medica-
tion to paralyze his diaphragm, preventing him from breathing; Jack still reveals noth-
ing).  But see 24: Day 2: 7:00 PM–8:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Feb. 11, 2003) (show-
ing that after Jack’s interrogation of a suspected terrorist fails, Jack stages the killing of 
the terrorist’s son and makes the terrorist watch the “murder” on tape, and the terrorist 
still refuses to talk); 24: Day 5: 6:00 PM–7:00 PM (FOX television broadcast Mar. 6, 2006) 
(showing Jack giving a man large doses of a pain-inducing drug to convince him to reveal 
information, but the man refuses to succumb). 
 60 24: Day 6: 12:00 PM–1:00 PM, supra note 57. 
693-712 KAMIN.DOC 9/25/2007 8:14:13 AM 
708 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:693 
ble.61 
Second, torture is used only on the guilty and only when it is 
imminently necessary to obtain information.  In much the same 
way that Inbau and Reid counseled that coercive interrogation 
techniques should only be used when there is a high probability 
of the suspect’s guilt,62 so Jack and his colleagues resort to tor-
ture only when it is clear that nothing else will get the job done.63   
Third, Jack Bauer does not seem to enjoy employing tor-
ture.64  While others on the show—Islamic terrorists, the Chi-
nese—either use torture gratuitously or seem to derive a sadistic 
thrill from its use, Jack resorts to it only when it is necessary and 
only when he is convinced that it will produce the results he 
needs.  If the “ticking time-bomb” scenario is the best argument 
for torture—Alan Dershowitz argues that a warrant for torture 
should be issued if necessary to prevent imminent harm65—then 
24 makes that argument each week.  Given how successful tor-
ture is at obtaining the truth, and given how high the stakes are 
on 24, it is hard to see how anyone could be against torture.66 
 
 61 See, e.g., Todd R. Samelman, Note, Junk Science in Federal Courts: Judicial Un-
derstanding of Scientific Principles: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993), 6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 263, 264 (2001) (“Over the seventy-year use of the 
Frye standard, only the admissibility of lie detector tests received negative treat-
ment . . . .”). 
 62 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 451 (1966) (“In a serious case, the interrogation 
may continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but with no respite 
from the atmosphere of domination.  It is possible in this way to induce the subject to talk 
without resorting to duress or coercion.  The method should be used only when the guilt of  
the subject appears highly probable.” (quoting CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 112 (1956))). 
 63 See, for example, 24: Day 6: 10:00 AM–11:00 AM, supra note 52, where Jack suffo-
cates his brother with a plastic bag to gain information; 24: Day 6: 12:00 AM–1:00 PM 
(FOX television broadcast Feb. 5, 2007), where Jack, in desperation, has his brother in-
jected with a painful serum to force him to speak; 24: Day 6: 5:00 PM–6:00 PM, supra note 
58, where Jack uses a cigar cutter to cut off the tip of a suspect’s pinky and threatens to 
shoot him in order to prevent nuclear warheads from launching; 24: Day 2: 9:00 PM–10:00 
PM, supra note 58, where Jack shoots the only available terrorist with knowledge of a 
bomb’s location and refuses to give her pain killers until she gives information; see also 
24: Day 5: 6:00 PM–7:00 PM, supra note 59; 24: Day 4: 5:00 PM–6:00 PM (FOX television 
broadcast Feb. 28, 2005).  But see id., where Jack tortures Paul Raines with an electric 
wire in the mistaken belief that he is associated with terrorists; Paul quickly forgives 
Jack, eventually taking a bullet that was meant for him. 
 64 See, e.g., 24: Day 6, 7:00 AM–8:00 AM, supra note 56; 24: Day 6, 12:00 PM–1:00 
PM, supra note 57.  As one expert has put it, Jack seems surprisingly unchanged by the 
things he has done over the years.  See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 6, at 72 (“Joe Navarro, one 
of the F.B.I.’s top experts in questioning techniques . . . told me, ‘Only a psychopath can 
torture and be unaffected.  You don’t want people like that in your organization.  They are 
untrustworthy, and tend to have grotesque other problems.’”). 
 65 Dershowitz, supra note 43. 
 66 In fact, the popularity of the show has been taken by some on the right as an en-
dorsement of the use of torture in the War on Terror.  For example, on the Fox News 
Channel, conservative commentator Laura Ingraham described the popularity of the show 
24 as being “as close to a national referendum” on the use of “tough tactics” in the War on 
Terror as we are likely to see.  The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News Channel broadcast Sept. 13, 
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IV. THE 24 EFFECT 
As I stated above, my concern is not necessarily that torture 
will return to the interrogation rooms of the United States.67  
While police professionalization and judicial oversight may not 
have entirely eliminated the abuse of suspects in our country, 
these processes have largely removed the third degree from the 
repertoire of techniques available to officers interested in obtain-
ing a conviction.  Furthermore, given the lack of scrutiny that 
courts generally give to Mirandized confessions,68 police officers 
working today rarely need to resort to physical abuse in order to 
obtain confessions. 
What concerns me about the current torture debate in the 
United States is the desensitizing effect that depictions of torture 
can have.  Compared with torture, coercive but non-violent inter-
rogation techniques—the litany of techniques expressly disap-
proved of by the Miranda court—pale by comparison.  Isolating a 
suspect from his support network, diminishing the seriousness of 
his crime, feigning sympathy for his plight, using promises of le-
niency or threats of increased punishment to obtain a confes-
sion—these techniques simply do not resonate with the American 
public the way physical brutality does.69  As a result, I fear that 
the public as well as the courts may become even more accepting 
of these practices than they already are. 
Why would this increased acceptance of coercive but non-
 
2006). 
 67 Not everyone is so sanguine about the lines between torture in the military and 
torture at home.  For example, in an article in Slate magazine, Darius Rejali argues that 
the connection has been made before: 
[T]his corruption will not be limited to the military.  Two-track interrogation 
systems have similar corrupting influences in domestic policing, particularly as 
former interrogators and MPs seek jobs as police officers after being decommis-
sioned.  The military tortures in the Franco-Algerian War soon seeped into 
French policing in the 1960s.  And in the United States, this kind of slippage 
has happened twice: initially, as the water tortures of the Spanish-American 
War began appearing in police stations in the 1920s, and again as electrical 
techniques used during the Vietnam War appeared in Chicago policing in the 
1970s.  These torturers-turned-policemen-turned-torturers were especially at-
tracted to techniques that were clean, and there is every reason to believe that 
the clean techniques now approved in the Iraq war will, sooner or later, appear 
in a neighborhood near you. 
Darius Rejali, Containing Torture: How Torture Begets Even More Torture, SLATE, Oct. 
27, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2152268/. 
 68 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“[c]ases in which a 
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘com-
pelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of 
Miranda are rare.” (alteration in original) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
433 n.20 (1984))). 
 69 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the 
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 910 (2004). 
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torturous interrogation be so problematic?  It is important to re-
member that the techniques currently in use by police depart-
ments were extensively catalogued and explicitly critiqued by the 
Miranda court.  On its way to mandating the now-familiar warn-
ings, the Court described these psychologically coercive tech-
niques as being “equally destructive of human dignity” as the 
third degree.70  Even if we do not find this appeal to human dig-
nity compelling,71 there is great reason to be concerned about co-
ercion in the interrogation room. 
Principally, for my purposes, it is important to remember 
that the coercive interrogation techniques catalogued but ulti-
mately upheld in Miranda are likely to produce false confessions.  
The social science literature on interrogation makes two things 
very clear: One, false confessions are a leading cause of wrongful 
convictions, and two, they are most often attributable to coercive 
interrogation techniques.  As Leo, Drizin, Neufeld, Hall, and 
Vatner recently wrote: 
The primary cause of false confession is the interrogator’s 
use of psychologically coercive interrogation techniques 
such as implicit or explicit promises of leniency in ex-
change for confession and threats of differential punish-
ment in the absence of confession.  Other coercive tech-
niques include lengthy or incommunicado interrogation; 
depriving essential necessities such as food, sleep, water, 
or access to bathroom facilities; refusing to honor a sus-
pect’s request to terminate interrogation; and inducing 
extreme exhaustion and fatigue.  Some researchers have 
argued that additional situational risk factors that may 
cause innocent people to confess falsely include physical 
custody and isolation, confrontation, and minimization 
techniques.72 
If this parade of horribles sounds familiar, it should.  The in-
terrogation techniques that Leo and his co-authors identify with 
false confessions match up with surprising consistency to the 
 
 70 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (“It is obvious that such an interro-
gation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the 
will of his examiner.  This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation.  To be sure, 
this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity.”). 
 71 See, e.g., id. at 539 (White, J., dissenting).  
  The most basic function of any government is to provide for the security of 
the individual and of his property.  These ends of society are served by the 
criminal laws which for the most part are aimed at prevention of crime.  With-
out the reasonably effective performance of the task of preventing private vio-
lence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized val-
ues. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 72 Richard A. Leo, et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal 
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 517. 
693-712 KAMIN.DOC 9/25/2007 8:14:13 AM 
2007] The 24 Effect 711 
techniques described by the Miranda Court as common interro-
gation techniques in the post-Brown world.73 
The danger of a false confession that is induced by coercive 
techniques is compounded by the apparently innocuous nature of 
these techniques.  The risk of false confessions leading to wrong-
ful conviction would be greatly minimized if it were broadly un-
derstood that coercive interrogation techniques can induce even 
an innocent person to confess.  Sadly, however, quite the opposite 
appears to be the case.  As Drizin and Leo write: 
[I]n the era of psychological interrogation, the phenomenon of false 
confession has become counter-intuitive.  Because police interrogation 
is beyond the common knowledge of individuals who have neither ex-
perienced it firsthand as a criminal suspect nor performed it as a 
trained police officer—i.e., the vast majority of the American public—
most people are ignorant of the psychologically manipulative methods 
and strategies of police interrogators.  Most people do not appear to 
know that interrogation-induced false confessions even exist, let alone 
that police detectives are sent to specialized training schools to learn 
the techniques of interrogation or how and why they are designed to 
manipulate the perceptions, reasoning, and decision-making of a cus-
todial suspect and thus lead to the decision to confess.  Like many 
criminal justice officials, most people appear to believe in what one of 
the authors has labeled “the myth of psychological interrogation”: that 
an innocent person will not falsely confess to a serious crime unless he 
is physically tortured or mentally ill.74 
In other words, the impact of psychological interrogation is com-
pounded by its stealth character.  Because the defendant does not 
appear in the courtroom with bruises and welts, it is easier for 
the judge to find that his confession was voluntarily given. 
As we become more accustomed to bruised and beaten bodies 
in Iraq, on television dramas, and in the movies, the gap between 
what we know is possible and what happens in the run-of-the-
mill criminal case will inevitably become wider.  My fear is that 
as we become more aware of the possibility and reality of horrific 
violence being perpetrated against detainees, anything less than 
that will come to seem tame by comparison.  This will lead courts 
to monitor Mirandized interrogations even less than they do now, 
will likely produce more coerced confessions, and will ultimately 
result in more false confessions and wrongful convictions.  This 
should be troubling regardless of one’s views about the wisdom or 
legitimacy of Miranda. 
 
 73 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446–47. 
 74 Drizin & Leo, supra note 69, at 910. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fortieth anniversary of the Miranda decision provides us 
with an opportunity to re-examine our recent past and to con-
sider the future of interrogation in this country.  From Bram to 
Brown to Miranda, courts have consistently, though not uni-
formly,75 increased their supervision of what happens in the sta-
tionhouse.  In response, law enforcement officials have adapted 
to these changing rules and have found ways to continue to ques-
tion suspects and obtain information within the dictates of the 
law. 
My concern is that torture will change this balance.  Because 
torture lowers our baseline assumptions about the fair treatment 
of detainees, I worry that it will negatively impact the judicial 
oversight of interrogation in a way that will be very difficult to 
undo. 
 
 75 The direction of the law is rarely uniform in any field.  There have been decisions, 
both before Miranda and after, that have had the effect of contracting rather than ex-
panding the rights of those undergoing interrogation.  See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 
U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda, but not of the 
Fifth Amendment itself, could be used for impeachment purposes); Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that a suspect subject to questioning during a traffic stop is 
not in custody for Miranda purposes); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (approving a 
Miranda waiver in a case where counsel had been retained by family members and had 
been expressly told by police officers that the suspect would not be interrogated that 
night); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that Miranda warnings need not 
be given when the officer who questions the suspect is undercover).  This list is by no 
means exhaustive. 
